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Something about personal jurisdiction seems to bring out the worst in the
Supreme Court. In the last twenty-four years, the Court has decided four
personal jurisdiction cases, and in three of them, it has been unable to muster a
majority opinion. 1 Between Burnham v. Superior Court in 1990, and J.
Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown in 2011, the Court's composition has almost completely changed,
with only Justices Scalia and Kennedy remaining. 2 Yet, the current Court is just
as splintered as the old one. Personal jurisdiction also seems to inspire foolish
remarks and poor opinions, and Nicastro may set a new low in that regard.
At least part of the problem sterns from confusion over the sovereignty
limitations inherent in personal jurisdiction, and the relationship between
sovereignty concerns and due process in personal jurisdiction analysis. This
confusion plays out vividly in Nicastro, with Justice Kennedy asserting that the
problem with Justice Brennan's approach in Asahi was that "[i]t discarded the
central concept of sovereign authority in favor of considerations of fairness and
foreseeability." 3 By contrast, Justice Ginsburg asserts that "constitutional limits
on a state court's adjudicatory authority derive from considerations of due
process, not state sovereignty."4 Both statements are wrong, or are at least
misleading.
In this symposium contribution I do two things. First, I explore the
relationship between sovereignty and due process in personal jurisdiction

*Dean and Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. I am very grateful to
Richard Freer and Corinna Lain for their comments and suggestions.
I.
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (20 11) (decided by a
majority of the Court); J. Mcintyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (plurality
opinion); Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (plurality opinion); Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (plurality opinion).
2. Compare Burnham, 495 U.S. at 606-07, with Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2785.
3. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788 (plurality opinion).
4. !d. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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doctrine. Second, I examine how confusion about this relationship is manifested
in some of the more problematic aspects of the Nicastro opinions. I conclude
that, although at one time the concept of sovereignty provided an important
analytic component of personal jurisdiction analysis, this is largely no longer
true.
I.

BACK TO THE FOUNTAINHEAD: PENNOYER V. NEFF

Much of the credit (or blame) for modem personal jurisdiction doctrine dates
back to Pennoyer v. Neff. 5 It is there that the Court explicitly addressed concerns
about sovereignty and, for the first time, introduced the Due Process Clause into
personal jurisdiction doctrine. 6 However, these two elements-sovereignty and
due process-were approached in Pennoyer quite differently than they are
described in modem opinions, so it is worth revisiting what Pennoyer actually
said.
Justice Field's personal jurisdiction analysis began by focusing on states and
the scope of their power. He noted that except as limited by the Constitution,
states "possess and exercise the authority of independent States," and that the
principles of international law concerning personal jurisdiction are applicable to
the states. 7 He then laid out what he believed to be universal and undisputed
principles of public international law-that "every State possesses exclusive
jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory," and
that "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or
8
property without its territory." From these principles, Justice Field concluded
that in-state service is a necessary prerequisite for personal jurisdiction. 9
To the extent that Field believed that in-state service is a necessary corollary
of territorial boundaries, the opinion is undeniably wrong. Many territorially
defined nations do not agree that in-state service is either necessary or
sufficient. 10 Nonetheless, Field's broader analytic approach is significant. In
determining the scope of state judicial authority, his analysis focused on the
state, not the defendant. Field formulated his jurisdictional inquiry by asking
what power a state has over people inside and outside its boundaries, rather than
asking when defendants are subject to jurisdiction.ll Additionally, Field saw
nothing in our federal structure that limits our states differently than nations are
limited with respect to the substantive scope of their personal jurisdiction

5.
6.

95 U.S. 714 (1878).
See id. at 722, 733.
7. /d. at 722.
8.
/d. (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICf OF LAWS 19-20 (2d ed.
1841); HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 110-11 (George Grafton Wilson
ed., WilliamS. Hein & Co. photo. reprint 1995) (Richard Henry Dana, Jr. ed., 1866)).
9.
/d. at 733.
10. See Russell J. Weintraub, An Objective Basis for Rejecting Transient Jurisdiction, 22
RUTGERS L.J. 611, 613-16 (1991).
11. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
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authority. 12 He therefore looked to international law as a source for delineating
the scope of sovereign authority that states possess with respect to personal
jurisdiction. 13 Whether or not his understanding of international law was correct,
this part of the opinion puts states, and the scope of their sovereign authority, at
the center of its analysis.
The real innovation of Pennoyer was not the focus on sovereignty, but rather
the introduction of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as a
basis to refuse to enforce a judgment. Justice Field began this part of the
analysis by noting that under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, one state was not
required to enforce a judgment from another state that was void under the
14
principles of jurisdiction he had laid out. However, because the Full Faith and
Credit Clause is applicable only to judgments where enforcement is sought in
another state, Justice Field was concerned that a void judgment might
nonetheless be enforceable within the rendering state:
[I]f the whole proceeding, without service upon him or his appearance,
is coram non judice and void; if to hold a defendant bound by such a
judgment is contrary to the first principles of justice,-it is difficult to
15
see how the judgment can legitimately have any force within the State.
As troubled as he was by the prospect of a state enforcing its own void judgment,
Justice Field recognized that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not provide a
basis for challenging an intra-state enforcement of a void judgment and "there
was no mode of directly reviewing such judgment or impeaching its validity
within the State where rendered." 16 It was at this point that Justice Field turned
to the Due Process Clause:
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be directly questioned,
and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that
proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal rights and
obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not
constitute due process oflaw. 17
Thus, the Due Process Clause provided a hook to allow an intra-state challenge
to a judgment rendered in violation of the principles of sovereignty and
international law that he had earlier described.

12.
13.
14.
IS.
16.
17.

See id.
See id. at 729 (citing D' Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1850)).
/d. (citing M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. 312, 327 (1839)).
/d. at 732.
/d.

/d.at733.
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Significantly, although Justice Field invoked the Fourteenth Amendment as
a tool for challenging a judgment rendered without jurisdiction, the Court
nowhere suggested that the Due Process Clause provided the substantive criteria
for jurisdiction. This is evident in the structure of the opinion. The principles of
jurisdiction are found in the beginning of the opinion before the discussion of the
18
Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause was introduced towards the
end of the opinion after Field had already delineated the scope of states'
jurisdictional authority. Treating the Due Process Clause as a tool to challenge
enforcement of a judgment, but not as a source of the substantive criteria, also
allows Pennoyer to fit more comfortably within the preexisting Full Faith and
Credit Clause cases which had long reco~nized the existence of limits on
personal jurisdiction and which Field cited. 1 Under Pennoyer' s approach, the
Full Faith and Credit Clause continues to control in the inter-state context and
the Due Process Clause simply provides a vehicle to transport the principle
developed in the interstate full faith and credit context to the intra-state context.
Using the Due Process Clause as a tool to challenge invalid judgments, but
not as the source of the standards for validity, is completely consistent with the
principle that the Due Process Clause protects individual rights. Due process
requires that a judgment be rendered by a court of competent juris diction. 20 The
right that is protected by that clause is the right not to have liberty or property
taken by a state that is acting "coram non judice"-without legitimate
authority. 21
Thus, from a broad structural perspective, Pennoyer established several
noteworthy propositions. First, the state and an understanding of the scope of
state power is the appropriate starting point for analyzing personal jurisdiction.
Second, there is nothing unique in our federal structure that requires substantive
limitations on our states that are different from those that exist in the
international context. Third, the Due Process Clause provides a basis for
resisting in-state enforcement of a judgment that exceeds a state's legitimate
authority, but it does not provide the standards for determining the scope of each
state's jurisdictional reach. Over the next century and a half, all three of these
propositions were altered, although in most cases without explicit reexamination.

18. See id. at 721-23.
19. See id. at 729-30 (citing D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. 165, 174 (1850) (holding that a
New York judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit in Louisiana because one of the
defendants was not served with process); M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. 312, 327 (1839) (holding
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause applied only when the court rendering the decision had
jurisdiction of the parties)).
20. See id. at 733.
21. See id.
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DUE PROCESS AS A SOURCE OF SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS

Although Pennoyer introduced the Due Process Clause as a mechanism that
would allow a direct challenge to excessive exercises of jurisdiction, by the
twentieth century the Due Process Clause began to assume a more substantive
role. This is apparent in the way the Supreme Court and litigants began to frame
and understand the issue presented in personal jurisdiction cases. Consider Hess
v. Pawloski.Z2 In that case, a Massachusetts statute designated a state official to
be the agent for service of process for any non-resident who drove a car into
Massachusetts and was subsequently sued on a claim arising out of an
3
automobile accident in Massachusetts.Z If the issue were framed using the
structure described in Pennoyer, the question presented would have been
whether in acting pursuant to this statute, Massachusetts lacked legitimate
authority and, as a result, enforcement of any subsequent judgment would have
violated the Due Process Clause. Not surprisingly, that awkward formulation
was framed instead as "whether the Massachusetts enactment contravenes the
24
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
While Hess's statement of the issue presented might have reflected simply a
25
more streamlined use of language, by the time of International Shoe, it was
clear that the Due Process Clause was providing substantive criteria. In what is
probably the most widely quoted sentence from International Shoe, Justice Stone
suggests that the substantive criteria for personal jurisdiction derives from due
process:

[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice." 26
Under the Pennoyer approach, the due process violation consisted of enforcing a
judgment rendered by a court that lacked legitimate authority, but the standards
for determining legitimacy were derived separately from that clause. In contrast,
International Shoe suggests that the Due Process Clause itself embodies certain
criteria for legitimacy.
7
In World- Wide Volkswagen/ the transformation of due process from a
mechanism to allow a direct challenge of jurisdiction to the source of substantive

22. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
23. ld. at 354 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, as amended by Stat. 1923, ch. 431,
§ 2 (current version at MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 90 § 3A (West 2001)).
24. Id. at 355.
25. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
26. ld. at 316 (emphasis added) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,463 (1940)).
27. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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standards by which to assess such a challenge was so complete that the Court
could, without notice or apparent embarrassment, misstate the actual holding of
Pennoyer. The majority opinion in World-Wide Volkswagen, citing Pennoyer,
stated: "A judgment rendered in violation of due process is void in the rendering
State and is not entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere."28 However, the more
accurate description of Pennoyer's holding would have been: If a judgment is
void and not entitled to full faith and credit, then it would violate due process to
enforce it in the rendering state. 29 The inversion of the holding is significant
because it makes due process the source of the substantive standards for
jurisdiction, which in turn facilitated the shift to a defendant-focused approach.
III. THE ROLE OF SOVEREIGNTY

Pennoyer began the analysis of personal jurisdiction by focusing on the state
and its characteristics, and having concluded that our states are in all relevant
respect like nations, looked to international law as the source of guidance. 30
Pennoyer's analysis might therefore be called "sovereignty-based" because it
focused on the nature of states and relied on a body of law-international lawthat is similarly state-based in its focus. Modern jurisdictional cases have moved
away from the state-based analytic approach that Justice Field used in Pennoyer.
It is the defendant, not the state, that is at the center of the analysis, and
international law has virtually disappeared as a relevant touchstone. It is true
that the cases include frequent references to "sovereignty" and "federalism," but
these words have little analytic significance.
The shift that put the defendant rather than the state at the center of the
jurisdictional inquiry is strikingly evident in International Shoe. The underlying
issue in that case was whether it was constitutional for Washington to extract
unemployment taxes from the out-of-state defendant corporation, and the
litigants thought that the primary issue concerned the power to tax, not personal
jurisdiction. 31 The majority opinion deals with the taxing power only briefly at
the end of the opinion and makes clear that the state's taxing power is obvious in
this case. 32 Yet, the opinion does not address the relationship between this
holding and the question of personal jurisdiction. Given the tax exception in
choice of law, 33 had the Court not found personal jurisdiction, Washington could
have been effectively powerless to collect this tax. The Court's failure to

28. Id. at 291 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,732-33 (1878)).
29. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 732-33.
30. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
31. See /nt'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 311; Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a
Salesman? Forum Shopping and Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 769,798-99 (1995).
32. See lnt'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 321.
33. See generally Robert L. Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental
Claims, 46 HARV. L. REV. 193, 215-17 (1932).
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consider the state's need for the tools to collect those taxes it was due,
dramatically highlights that state power was no longer the analytical starting
point. In place of a focus on the sovereignty needs of the state, Justice Stone
created, largely out of whole cloth, 34 the now famous language that the defendant
must have "certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
.

t'

JUS lCe.

,,35

Justice Black, in his prescient concurrence in International Shoe, recognized
that although the majority's holding expanded state jurisdictional authority, its
36
analytic approach was not state-centered and indeed threatened state power.
He understood that states needed jurisdictional power in order to fully exercise
other legitimate interests in protecting their citizens and implementing their
laws. 37 He expressed the concern that "fairness" might be used to restrict the
power of states to exercise judicial authority in support of their other legitimate
interests, writing:
I believe that the Federal Constitution leaves to each State, without
any "ifs" or "buts," a power to tax and to open the doors of its courts for
its citizens to sue corporations whose agents do business in those States.
Believing that the Constitution gave the States that power, I think it a
judicial deprivation to condition its exercise upon this Court's notion of
"fair play," however appealing that term may be. Nor can I stretch the
meaning of due process so far as to authorize this Court to deprive a
State of the right to afford judicial protection to its citizens on the
ground that it would be more "convenient" for the corporation to be
sued somewhere else. 38
Justice Black went on to observe: "True, the State's power is here upheld. But
the rule announced means that tomorrow's judgment may strike down a State or
Federal enactment on the ground that it does not conform to this Court's idea of
natural justice." 39
Not surprisingly, Justice Black later dissented in Hanson v. Denckla,40 a case
that further reinforced the shift away from the state as the analytic starting point
of the personal ~urisdiction analysis. Cases such as McGee v. International Life
42
Insurance Co.4 and Hess v Pawloskz had focused on the state's interest in

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See Cameron & Johnson, supra note 31, at 809-10.
lnt'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,463 (1940)).
See id. at 323 (Black, J., concurring).
See id.
/d. at 324-25.
/d. at 326.
357 U.S. 235, 256 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
355 u.s. 220, 223-24 ( 1957).
274 u.s. 352, 356 (1927).
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providing a forum. These cases were dismissed by the Hanson majority as
43
exceptions, and the Court offered a new verbal formulation, which added the
requirement that "the defendant purposefully avail[] itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State."44 The Court cited International
Shoe as the source of the purposeful availment requirement, though no such
language appears in that case. International Shoe does say that a state cannot
assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant "with which the state has no
contacts, ties, or relations," 45 but the opinion does not say that the contacts must
have been created by the defendant.
Justice Black, in his Hanson dissent, focused, as he had in International
Shoe, on the state. He discussed "Florida's interest" in the dispute and the many
connections the dispute had with Florida, 46 and then observed that:
[W]here a transaction has as much relationship to a State as Mrs.
Donner's appointment had to Florida its courts ought to have power to
adjudicate controversies arising out of that transaction, unless litigation
there would impose such a heavy and disproportionate burden on a
nonresident defendant that it would offend what this Court has referred
47
to as "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
In other words, Justice Black began by focusing on the state and then turned to

concerns about the defendant as a kind of second-stage safety valve for the rare
case that imposed unusual burdens. He was attentive to concerns about
territoriality, and explained that there was nothing in his approach that was
indifferent to state boundaries:
Of course we have not reached the point where state boundaries are
without significance, and I do not mean to suggest such a view here.
There is no need to do so. For we are dealing with litigation arising
from a transaction that had an abundance of close and substantial
connections with the State of Florida.48
While Justice Black put the state at the center of the inquiry, the majority in
Hanson focused on the activities of the defendant and this approach became even
more frrmly established in World- Wide Volkswagen. 49 World- Wide Volkswagen

43. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251-53; Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Coun, the Due Process
Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25
u. em. L. REv. 569,621-22 (1958).
44. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 (citing Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
45. lnt'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
46. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 257-59 (Black, J., dissenting).
47. !d. at 258-59 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S.
at316).
48. !d. at 260.
49. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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was not a case of a state reaching out to decide a matter in which it had no
legitimate interest. In that case, a car had exploded within Oklahoma, Oklahoma
citizens had put their lives at risk trying to rescue the victims, and the plaintiffs
had spent months in a burn ward in Oklahoma. 50 Nonetheless, the Court held
that there was no jurisdiction in Oklahoma because, according to the majorit(,
5
the defendant had not purposefully affiliated itself with the state of Oklahoma.
Despite (or maybe because of) the strong focus on the defendant, rather than
on the needs or character of the state as a sovereign, the Supreme Court in
World-Wide Volkswagen tried to situate its approach within broader concerns
about sovereignty and federalism. The Court observed that states retained "the
sovereign power to try causes in their courts," but then noted that "[t]he
sovereignty of each State ... implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its
sister States." 52 Unfortunately, this general observation about the relationship
among the states does little to illuminate the scope of personal jurisdiction in any
particular case. Even if it were true that allowing Oklahoma jurisdiction in this
case would somehow diminish the sovereignty of other states with respect to this
case, allowing jurisdiction here would also mean that other states would have
greater power when the tables were turned.
Not satisfied to talk about sovereignty in general, the Court in World- Wide
Volkswagen also refers to federalism and describes the Due Process Clause as
"an instrument of interstate federalism." 53 The reference to federalism implies
that with respect to personal jurisdiction, states within our federal structure must
have powers that are different from those that foreign nations have. Justice Field
in Pennoyer thought otherwise, 54 and the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen
never explains why it disagrees with Field. Moreover, as with its discussion of
sovereignty, the Court never explains the link between federalism and the
particular jurisdictional test that the Court adopts. Even assuming that states are
different from nations in some relevant way, what feature of interstate federalism
necessitates purposeful availment as the appropriate test? The Court does not
say. Nor does it connect concerns about federalism with its analysis of the facts
of the particular case.
Despite the Court's talk about federalism and sovereignty, these concepts do
not do any analytic work in World- Wide Volkswagen, and neither the state nor
state sovereignty are at the center of its analysis. The Court does not frame the
jurisdictional inquiry by asking, "What jurisdictional authority does a state or
nation have (and need) by virtue of being a sovereign entity?" Instead, the Court

50.
the Story,
51.
52.
53.
54.

See id. at 288; Charles W. Adams, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson--'The Rest of
72 NEB. L. REV. 1122, 1123-26 (1993).
World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295.
Id. at 293.
ld. at 294.
See supra text accompanying note 30.
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focuses on the defendant and whether it has acted purposefully to affiliate itself
with the forum. 55
Two years after World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court in Insurance Corp. of
Ireland 56 explicitly recognized the reality of modern personal jurisdiction
doctrine-that it was no longer a state-centered doctrine, but defendant-centered
instead. As the Court explained: "The personal jurisdiction requirement
recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction
on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual
liberty." 57 Of course, as noted above, even when the analysis is not sovereigntybased, personal jurisdiction remains a doctrine about sovereignty in the
definitional sense that whatever jurisdictional reach the Court accords a state is
by definition the scope of its jurisdictional sovereignty.
In a footnote, the Court explicitly embraced the view that the Due Process
Clause is the source of the substantive criteria for personal jurisdiction: "The
restriction on state sovereign power described in World- Wide Volkswagen
Corp., . .. must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest
preserved by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the
personal jurisdiction requirement .... " 58 The Court's analysis includes an
inaccurate premise-it is not true that the Due Process Clause "is the only source
of the personal jurisdiction requirement." Limitations on personal jurisdiction
were addressed under the Full Faith and Credit Clause long before the
Fourteenth Amendment even existed. 59 Still, the statement leaves no doubt that
the Court has moved away from the more limited function of due process that the
Court in Pennoyer set forth.
The Court in Insurance Corp. of Ireland also explicitly rejects "federalism"
as a restriction on jurisdiction:
[T]he [Due Process Clause] itself makes no mention of federalism
concerns. Furthermore, if the federalism concept operated as an
independent restriction on the sovereign power of the court, it would not
be possible to waive the personal jurisdiction requirement: Individual
actions cannot change the powers of sovereignty, although the
individual can subject himself to powers from which he may otherwise
be protected. 60
The Court is certainly correct that the Due Process Clause is not a provision
directed at federalism. The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to protect
people (particularly the newly freed slaves) from states, not to protect states from

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295.
Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
/d. at 702.
/d. at 703 n.IO.
See supra text accompanying note 19.
Ins. Corp. of Jr., 456 U.S. at 702-03 n.lO.
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other states. However, the Court's waiver argument is not particularly
persuasive. It is not true that a federalism-based constraint on state power would
preclude waiver by private litigants.
Federalism concerns animate the
limitations on legislative jurisdiction (i.e., choice of law). 61 Nonetheless, if the
parties do not raise a choice of law issue, most courts will apply forum law on
62
the theory of party acquiescence.
Notwithstanding Insurance Corp. of Ireland's explicit rejection of
sovereignty as a core component of personal jurisdiction, the theme of
sovereigntl has persisted and, as discussed below, returned to center stage in
Nicastro. 6 One explanation for this persistence is that regardless of whether
sovereignty does any analytic work, there is a sense in which all personal
jurisdiction cases are about sovereignty. The power to exercise judicial authority
is an important element of state sovereignty, just as "legislative jurisdiction"the power of a state to regulate conduct through its substantive law-is an
important aspect of state sovereignty. Sovereignty used in this sense tells us
nothing about the proper analytic approach to personal jurisdiction, it is simply
the label we apply to whatever judicial authority is granted to the states. Thus,
even a defendant-focused approach to personal jurisdiction, or one based solely
on considerations of fairness, is ultimately about sovereignty since the outcome
of the analysis tells us, essentially by definition, the extent to which the state will
be able to exercise this element of sovereign authority. But there is a critical
difference between using sovereignty in this definitional sense and the approach
of Justices Field and Black. Those Justices put the state at the center of their
analytic approach. In contrast, the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen focuses its
analysis on the defendant and the defendant's conduct, not on the state. Having
determined that Oklahoma could not exercise jurisdiction, the Court likewise
determined the scope of Oklahoma's "sovereignty." However, sovereignty is
what is left at the end of the analysis, rather than the starting point.
To summarize, the changes since Pennoyer are these: Due process has been
transformed from a tool to challenge otherwise void judgments into a doctrine
that provides the standard for assessing whether personal jurisdiction should be
permitted. Moreover, the core inquiry in personal jurisdiction is no longer a
state-centered inquiry that focuses on the nature of state sovereignty, but rather a
defendant-centered inquiry. Finally, the Court has implied, by its references to
federalism that there is something unique within our federal system that requires
a different approach to jurisdiction than exists in international law, though it has
never explicitly articulated what those differences are.

61. See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Cornrn'n, 294 U.S. 532, 544-47 (1935)
(discussing full faith and credit limits on choice of law).
62. See PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFUCf OF
LAWS 610 (5th ed. 2010).
63. See infra text accompanying notes 67-71.
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The Supreme Court's latest unsuccessful attempt to bring some coherence to
the area of personal jurisdiction is J. Mcintyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro. 65 In
Nicastro, the Court voted 6-to-3 to reverse New Jersey's exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant, but it could not muster a majority opinion. 66 Of
the three opinions, Justice Kennedy's puts the most apparent reliance on
sovereignty and federalism, but it uses them least persuasively.
Much of Justice Kennedy's opinion is devoted to criticizing Brennan's
opinion in Asahi for "discard[ing] the central concept of sovereign[ty]."67 Yet,
despite frequent references to sovereignty, it is not clear what Kennedy means.
He does not seem to mean an analytic approach that puts the state, rather than the
defendant, at the center of the inquiry because, as Kennedy explains, "it is the
defendant's actions ... that empower a State's courts to subject him to
judgment." 68 One irony about Kennedy's attack on Brennan, is that Brennan,
unlike Kennedy, had suggested that the Court should in fact consider the needs
of the state as a sovereign entity in constructing the rules for personal
jurisdiction. In his dissent in World- Wide Volkswagen, and again in Burger
King, Brennan invoked the state's '"manifest interest in providing effective
means of redress' for its citizens. " 69
In addition to relying on sovereignty as an explanation for the particular rule
of jurisdiction that he endorses, Kennedy briefly refers to federalism as a
relevant principle. But, as with sovereignty, the invocation here is largely
vacuous: "[I]f another State were to assert jurisdiction in an inappropriate case, it
would upset the federal balance .... " 70 Maybe so, but this statement hardly
explains what constitutes "an inappropriate case." It is hard to see how the
federal balance would have been upset if the United States adopted jurisdictional
rules comparable to those used in the European Union that would permit
jurisdiction at the place of the injury. 71 Would federalism really have been
jeopardized if Oklahoma had been allowed to provide a forum for redress of
injuries that occurred in Oklahoma in World- Wide Volkswagen?
Maybe Kennedy's reference to federalism is intended as an indirect way to
counter Justice Ginsburg's reference to jurisdictional practices internationally.
Ginsburg notes, for example, that the European Union allows personal

64. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH act 2, sc. 3.
65. 131 s. Ct. 2780 (2011).
66. See id. at 2785.
67. /d. at 2788 (plurality opinion).
68. /d. at 2789.
69. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 300 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)); see also Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 483 (1985) (citing McGee, 355 U.S. at 223).
70. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion).
71. See id. at 2803-04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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jurisdiction in tort cases in the place where the harmful event occurs.
Kennedy's opinion, maybe by way of response, refers to "the premises and
unique genius of our Constitution." 73 Justice Field in Pennoyer thought that
states were sufficiently like nations for purposes of jurisdiction and that
international law provided the appropriate set of principles. 74 Justice Kennedy is
not alone in ignoring this aspect of Pennoyer, but the invocation of general
language about the "unique genius of our Constitution" does not begin to explain
why we have rejected this aspect of Pennoyer.
What is unique about our federal system is the presence of a Full Faith and
Credit Clause. 75 Among independent nations, a country may exercise its judicial
sovereignty as it sees fit, but it runs the risk that other nations may not enforce its
judgments. Unlike independent nations, states are not free to decide for
themselves which judgments they will and will not enforce. They are also not
free to enter into treaties or conventions with each other and thereby negotiate
about what would constitute a sensible allocation of judicial authority. Because
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, we need a federal standard delineating what
judgments are enforceable under that clause. But there is nothing in that clause
that requires the adoption of any particular standard or approach to jurisdiction.
Justice Field thought that the operative standard under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause was "natural justice" and the "rules of public law which protect persons
and property within one State from the exercise of jurisdiction over them by
another." 76 Justice Kennedy may think otherwise, but he has identified nothing
inherent in our federal structure that mandates a particular set of jurisdictional
rules.
Notwithstanding Kennedy's insistence that his approach is based on
sovereignty, it seems instead to be based on a particular notion of individual
liberty. Kennedy's focus on "purposeful availment" by the defendant and
"submission" 77 suggests that Kennedy believes that defendants have a liberty
interest in not being subject to the governmental authority of a state with which
they have not affirmatively affiliated themselves.
To the extent Kennedy's approach to jurisdiction is informed by a
conception of state sovereignty, Justice Kennedy apparently believes that states
have no power or authority separate from what is conferred by the defendant. 78
Kennedy argues first that the foundational element of personal jurisdiction is
whether the defendant "manifest[ed] an intention to submit to the power of a

72. See id.
73. ld. at 2789 (plurality opinion).
74. See supra text accompanying note 7.
75. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
76. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 730 (1878) (quoting Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 404,406 (1855)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2787-88 (plurality opinion) (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,414 (1984); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
78. See id.
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sovereign."79 He explains that "it is the defendant's actions ... that empower a
State's courts to subject him to judgment."80 In his view, a state's jurisdictional
authority is conferred in any particular case by the actions of the defendant and
not by preexisting authority. State courts apparently have no more inherent
authority than private arbitration panels and are impotent in the judicial arena
unless and until they have been empowered by the particular defendant. Thus, to
the extent Kennedy's approach is sovereignty-based, it reflects the view that
states' sovereign powers are quite limited.
Kennedy's strong embrace of the language of sovereignty in Nicastro is met
with an equally strong rejection of the concept by Justice Ginsburg. In her
dissent, Ginsburg explains that "the constitutional limits on a state court's
adjudicatory authority derive from considerations of due process, not state
sovereignty," 81 and that the "modern approach to jurisdiction" gives "prime
place to reason and fairness." 82 She concludes that "it would undermine
principles of fundamental fairness to insulate the foreign manufacturer from
accountability in court at the place within the United States where the
manufacturer's product caused injury." 83
Justice Ginsburg insists that jurisdiction is a concept grounded solely in due
process and concerns for the protection of the individual liberty of the
defendant. 84 Yet ironically, Ginsburg seems to be approaching jurisdiction not
from the point of view of the individual defendant, but from a broader
institutional perspective of state power. At one point in her opinion Justice
Ginsburg asks:
On what sensible view of the allocation of adjudicatory authority could
the place of Nicastro's injury within the United States be deemed off
limits for his products liability claim against a foreign manufacturer who
targeted the United States (including all the States that constitute the
Nation) as the territory it sought to develop? 85
Her very phrasing of the question puts the "sensible . . . allocation of
adjudicatory authority" at the center of her concerns. Likewise, the focus of her
fairness analysis is not limited to the particular defendant in the case before her.
Instead, she considers the realities of modern marketing86 and worries about the
87
impact of this jurisdictional ruling on domestic producers. Thus, while Justice

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

/d. at 2788.
/d. at 2789.
/d. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
!d. at 2800.
/d. at 2801-02.
See id. at 2798.
/d. at 2797.
See id. at 2799-801.
See id. at 2803-04.
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Ginsburg insists that jurisdiction is a concept anchored in due process, not
sovereignty, her approach is less defendant-centered and more focused on the
question of what authority states should be able to exercise in light of the
realities of modem commercial life.
V. CONCLUSION

In the topsy-turvy world of personal jurisdiction, Justice Kennedy can assert
that he is mostly concerned about sovereignty but adopt an approach to
jurisdiction that seems far more grounded in a particular vision of individual
liberty. In contrast, Justice Ginsburg can profess that her primary concern is to
protect due process rights of individuals, but in fact focus on what powers it is
reasonable for a state to have to address injuries occurring within its borders.
Conservative Justices, not otherwise known for their aggressive invocation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, can embrace a Due Process Clause that provides
expansive protection, while more liberal Justices seem to be on the states' rights
bandwagon, endorsing the power of the states to act without being unreasonably
limited by federal constitutional provisions.
If we could hit the doctrinal "reset" button, we might go back to those
aspects of Pennoyer that have been largely forgotten, but not explicitly
repudiated. We could begin with the reference point of international law and
give states the same jurisdictional authority that is generally accepted
internationally. Due process would not add substantive content, but would
provide the vehicle to challenge intrastate enforcement of judgments that would
not be recognized in the interstate context. I recognize that given the political
heat surrounding references to international law, this is not a likely outcome. A
more modest alternative would be for the Court to stop invoking sovereignty as
if it provided some analytical content-probably also not likely.
A final hopeful sign might be found in the concurrence of Justices Breyer
and Alito. They did not wade into the doctrinal thicket, but seemed to leave
open the possibility that with the right case, they would examine the doctrine
afresh. One can only hope that when the Justices find that case, the Court moves
away from formulaic invocations of sovereignty and federalism and towards a
more coherent approach.

